Madras High Court Strikes Down Registration Act Provision, Calls It Unconstitutional

The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on Tuesday struck down Section 34-C of the Registration Act, declaring it ultra vires of the Constitution. A Division Bench of Justices N. Sathish Kumar and M. Jothiraman held that the provision violates Article 14 of the Constitution and breaches the principle of separation of powers.

The court observed that Section 34-C permitted Sub-Registrars, who perform ministerial and administrative functions, to examine questions of title over immovable property. This power, the court said, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of competent civil courts. The adjudication of title disputes is a judicial function that cannot be delegated to an authority whose role is purely procedural under the Registration Act.

Section 34-C of the Registration Act commences with a non-obstante clause. The court noted that the Registration Act is concerned with the registration of documents, not with the underlying transactions affecting property. The rights and liabilities of parties arising from such transactions are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and other substantive laws. The Registration Act only provides a procedural framework for registration and public notice of documents, while the validity and legal consequences of property transactions are determined by the Transfer of Property Act.

The court quoted the Supreme Court's position: registration of a document is not conclusive proof of ownership; it merely creates a rebuttable presumption that can be challenged in a court of law. By empowering the Registering Authority to inquire into and decide questions of title, the impugned provision effectively substitutes a judicial function with an administrative one.

Specifically, Section 34-C allowed the Sub-Registrar to refuse registration if the property is ancestral and the original prior document is not available, unless a patta (revenue record) is produced. The court questioned how a Sub-Registrar, performing a ministerial role, could determine whether property is ancestral or joint family property—a factual matter requiring judicial adjudication.

The court further noted that the amendment resurrected earlier Rules that had already been struck down by a constitutional court. This not only infringes constitutional rights but also overrides substantive laws like the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act. The provision was held to be manifestly arbitrary and violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.