Ganga Water Treaty: Time to Reimagine, Not Just Renew, India-Bangladesh Pact
As the 30-year term of the 1996 Ganga Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh nears its end, discussions about its future are intensifying. While much of the public debate focuses on whether the treaty will be simply renewed or revised, a more fundamental question is emerging: what kind of agreement will replace it? The political, institutional, and ecological conditions that led to the 1996 treaty have changed dramatically, and the upcoming negotiations are likely to involve far more than water-sharing at Farakka.
The 1996 treaty was designed with a single objective: sharing the waters of the Ganga, following India's construction of the Farakka Barrage. It established a flow-dependent arrangement, including a 50:50 pro-rata sharing when flows fall below a certain level. Bangladesh has frequently expressed dissatisfaction, particularly over dry-season allocations.
The next treaty is unlikely to be limited to this single transboundary issue. It will likely transcend borders and territories, broadening the scope of negotiations. While this will be challenging—especially given the evolving political situation in Bangladesh—it also presents opportunities for stronger water diplomacy and enduring bilateral ties.
Two key factors are driving this expanded agenda. First, politics have grown more complex. The 1996 treaty was signed after decades of dialogue, reflecting a period of relatively stable bilateral relations built on trust and goodwill. Today, negotiations will be shaped as much by domestic political dynamics as by diplomatic considerations. In Bangladesh, Dhaka must navigate anti-India sentiment at home. In India, federal politics around Ganga water-sharing are equally intricate, with West Bengal prioritizing its own needs and Bihar raising concerns about siltation upstream of Farakka causing floods.
Second, the agenda has expanded beyond Farakka. Disagreements over other shared rivers, such as the Teesta, have emerged over the past three decades and will influence negotiations. Moreover, concerns now extend beyond water-resource sharing to climate change-related risks, including glacier management, hydrological extremes, ecosystem resilience, and shared vulnerabilities. This pushes the agenda toward regional cooperation rather than just bilateral allocations.
These changes have critical practical implications. First, negotiators must avoid what political geographers call the “territorial trap”—the assumption that talks occur only between two sovereign states. Water diplomacy cannot be separated from internal diplomacy in both countries. Dhaka must find ways to manage polarised domestic politics, and posturing as a bargaining strategy has limits. Signalling closer ties with China on the Teesta may strengthen Bangladesh's short-term position but risks securitising negotiations and reducing mutual benefits. As the downstream riparian, Dhaka’s long-term interests lie in stable cooperation.
India, too, must invest in federal diplomacy, despite recent electoral outcomes in Bihar and West Bengal that may ease cooperation. Getting states on board will not be easy, as water is an emotive issue that political opponents can exploit. Shared rivers create interdependencies that require careful management from both sides.
In sum, the 1996 treaty was a product of its time. The next agreement must address a broader, more complex reality. Both nations have an opportunity to craft a treaty that not only shares water but also builds resilience against climate change and strengthens bilateral relations for decades to come.
