Musk's Reported Starshield Curbs on Ukraine Put India's Tech Dependence in Focus
The Wall Street Journal has reported that SpaceX recently restricted Ukraine’s use of Starshield, its military-grade satellite communications network, in retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. The report says the action has a precedent: a similar move in 2022, which SpaceX disputed in media reports. The reported curbs have prompted questions about how exposed other countries are when they depend on foreign-controlled technology.
India is among them. The Indian government and industry have so far resisted Starlink’s entry, while Musk has continued to push for access. At the same time, parts of India’s critical infrastructure rely on services from foreign operators. These operators have acted lawfully so far, the report noted, but India still has strong reasons to develop domestic alternatives.
The report identifies a spectrum of risks. The worst is a foreign operator directly restricting a continuing service. Two less direct possibilities are a foreign-controlled platform disrupting access to an otherwise Indian system, and a foreign supplier gradually degrading India’s ability to sustain important capabilities.
In satellite communications, India has licensed three companies to provide satcom services: Starlink, the Indian subsidiary of Eutelsat OneWeb, and Jio Satellite Communications. As of October 16, none had received the security clearance needed to offer broadband services through commercial satellites. Eutelsat is French; the French government holds 29.65%, the British government 10.89%, and Bharti Space 17.88%. Bharti Airtel separately owns 26% of OneWeb’s Indian subsidiary. Jio Platforms and Luxembourg-based SES announced a joint venture in 2022 in which Jio would own 51% in exchange for use of SES satellites. But majority Indian ownership does not give Jio control of the network.
India does not depend heavily on foreign satellite networks for ordinary communications. Most telephone and internet traffic runs over terrestrial networks. ISRO has launched around 40 communications satellites since 1981, supporting broadcasting and strategic communications, and the country has dedicated military satellite communications capabilities. The three licensed ventures plan to offer satellite broadband services alone.
Satellite navigation is a weaker spot. India’s NavIC constellation has not been completed. On July 29, Minister of State for the Department of Space Jitendra Singh told Parliament that only three NavIC satellites were then able to provide positioning, navigation and timing signals. The constellation therefore cannot provide standalone positioning services; at least four satellites are required. The United States discontinued its policy of deliberately degrading global civilian GPS accuracy in 2000 and committed not to reinstate it, but it retains the ability to deny PNT services for military purposes over specific areas. ISRO’s difficulties in raising its launch rate have also affected NavIC’s functional integrity.
Cloud computing and IT are another area of concentration. Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud provide cloud infrastructure and managed services to thousands of businesses and public institutions in India. The reliance of public institutions on a small number of foreign providers raises questions about continuity, data governance and the ability to switch providers.
The report’s central point is not that foreign operators have misused their position in India. It is that India’s exposure is real and should be managed. The options include completing NavIC, encouraging domestic satellite and cloud capacity, and building safeguards into contracts and security clearances. For a country of India’s size, reducing avoidable dependence on foreign-controlled critical technology is a matter of strategic prudence, not autarky.
